It is not unusual for developmental problems to be seen as a shortage or a lack of something, and the solution is therefore to increase the volume of that to the desired level. Climate enthusiasts can, of course, argue that in the case of greenhouse gases, the problem is seen as one of minimising something to the desired level. But that reduction itself is supposed to be achieved through an increase in the production of renewable energy alternatives. By extension this can be applied to any sector -- the task of minimising illiteracy can be tackled by maximising literacy and that can be achieved by maximising other variables such as the number and quality of schools, the scope and scale of literacy missions, the production of textbooks etc.
It is simply convenient for public institutions and bureaucracies to articulate a strategy for solving a developmental problem in the form of a mostly quantitative maximisation of that which is supposed to be the solution -- and the easier thing to do is always the tempting thing to do (and vice-versa).
Unfortunately, this tendency for measuring mission success in terms of maximising implementation very soon waxes into all kinds of irrationality. One of the main is of course that of cognitive dissonance about which I have written before. The more a development project becomes "successful" i.e. the more it maximises, the more the senior leadership starts losing touch with reality and ignores every possible feedback loop. The result can be visualised in the form of the following (fun) graph, where an (imaginary) index of cognitive dissonance keeps increasing exponentially along with the duration of project implementation.
Jaga Mission - to Maximise or to Minimise ....WHAT ??
The complexity of a large and unique initiative such as Jaga Mission lay in the fact that some components had to be maximised, while others had to be minimised -- and these were, of course, interlinked.
Naturally, being one of the largest in-situ slum land titling initiatives in the world, the number of slum households covered by the Mission had to be maximised. Ideally, the coverage should maximise till all slum dwellers in the state are covered. However, the possibility of comprehensive coverage depends on the ownership of the land parcels on which the slums are situated. Despite the political will, the Mission was faced with the operational reality that it was possible for the state government to grant land titles only in those cases where the slums were located on parcels owned by various departments of the state government. As it was assumed that slums would most likely be located on public land parcels, it was not considered a variable of much importance.
However, once the geo-spatial datasets of Jaga Mission were prepared, it was discovered that there were quite a few slums which were either wholly or partly located on land parcels belonging to owners other than the state government.
What to do in such a situation ?
Well, surely you would hope that the number of such slums are low or that one could find ways so that their number would decrease. However, a new complication arose, when an idea started getting toyed with that such slums could probably be relocated to very nicely designed new habitats.
The original aim of granting in-situ land rights to slum dwellers came into competition with the temptation of a new goal of building new habitats. On the one hand, the Mission wished to show that more and more slum dwellers were getting security of tenure in the locations were they were already living, and on the other hand the Mission also wished to showcase more and more newly designed habitats.
But one goal necessarily negated the effect of the other - in fact, the more of the latter would mean a failure of the former.
As prominent architects got involved in the Mission, the tendency to construct new habitats increased even more. After all, it is far easier for an architect to be excited about the prospect of finding a "design" solution to the slum problem in a new greenfield site than comb through cadastral maps and revenue data to find alternatives to relocation.
When a substantial fee to architectural firms is added to the whole equation, then all social awareness generally goes out of the window quite enthusiastically.
As Jaga Mission had an alert and wise leadership, such tendencies were curbed before they could do much damage. This was done largely by switching to Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to analyse the data of Jaga Mission rather than just use spreadsheets. Given the size of Jaga Mission, an analysis based on spreadsheets would tend to identify the status of land ownership in a binary format -- belongs to state government or does not belong to state government.
However, Jaga Mission was granting individual titles to slum households and not collective tenure to the whole slum site. Therefore, what was important was the status of land ownership based on the exact locations of the various houses in the slum. If only very few houses were located on parcels not belonging to the state government, then a relocation of the whole slum was neither necessary nor feasible.
The solution therefore lay in minimisation based on the analysis of disaggregated spatial data.
As a result of such an analysis the number of slums that might require relocation reduced to less than 4 percent of the total slums covered by Jaga Mission.
Such a solution not only maximised the achievement of the original goal of the Mission (to grant in-situ land titles) but also maximised the quality and significance of the few new habitats that had to be made.
The maximisation of Mission success, was therefore achieved through a minimisation of new habitat construction.
However, in the planning and development paradigm of India, where the possible solution to a problem takes a life of its own and gets progressively dissociated from the very problem it was created to solve, such self-corrections are rare indeed.








